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Earthquake Economics 
Much of the United States is seismically 
active, but the greatest earthquake risks 
prevail in the western states (see map). 
Virtually every major metropolitan area west 
of the Rockies is in a high-risk zone, facing 
the potential of catastrophic losses. Estimates 
by the United States Geological Survey 
(USGS) suggest that a great earthquake in San 
Francisco today would cause 11,000 deaths, 
44,000 hospitalizations and about $40 
billion in propertydamage. Asimilarevent in 
Los Angeles would generate 23,000 deaths, 
91,000 hospitalizations and almost $70 
billion in damage. 
Against this background, it is sometimes 
surprising to learn that the marketplace does 
very I  ittle to accommodate earthquake risk. 
Despite the fact that over 150 carriers offer 
earthquake insurance coverage in California, 
for example, less than 6 percent of the 
households carrying home insurance regu-
larly purchase it. Nor do mortgage lenders, 
whose assets are secured by real estate 
subject to earthquake risk, routinely protect 
their portfolios with insurance. (Although a 
fire-coverage requirement is quite standard in 
mortgage contracts, no such requirement is 
widely applied in regard to earthquake risk.) 
Similarly, real-estate investors and builders 
often balk at incorporating earthquake-
resistance measures in construction projects. 
Earthquake risk 
Decision-making under earthquake risk, of 
course, is influenced by the tremendously 
powerful and damaging nature of earth-
quakes. The great Anchorage (Richter 8.6) 
earthquake of 1964, for example, moveda 
40,OOO-square-mile chunk of the earth's 
crust, thrusting it upward by as much as 30 
feet in some places. Even in the compara-
tively moderate (Richter 6.6) San Fernando 
Valley event of 1971, some structures experi-
enced ground-motion acceleration in excess 
of  one "g"-meaning horizontal forces equal 
to the full force of gravity. 
Even well-built structures will be severely 
damaged by such forces, although much 
depends on the type and quality of con-
struction. Engineering data suggest probable 
maximum losses of 7 to 15 percent of value 
for typical residences and other wood-frame 
construction, 20 to 35 percent for steel-frame 
buildings, and 25 to 85 percent for concrete 
and masonry construction of various qual-
ities. Loss of life will, in turn, likely be greater 
in the more severely damaged structures. 
But significant earthquakes are also relatively 
infrequent. Indeed, there has not been a 
major earthquake in any densely settled 
region of the country since the great San 
Francisco earthquake of 1906. Even in the 
shaky Far West, the probability of a great 
quake in any given year is quite low-two to 
five percent in the Los Angeles area and one 
percent in San Francisco, according to USGS 
estimates. 
Decision-making and risk 
Earthquakes may thus be characterized as 
low-probability, high-loss events. The 
conventional economic analysis of decison-
making under such conditions employs the 
"expected utility" theory that Milton 
Friedman and Leonard Savage developed in 
the 1940's. According to this theory, 
individuals weight the psychic value of 
alternative outcomes (rather than the 
outcome itself) by the probabilities of 
occurence of each outcome. Risk-averse 
individuals assign a smaller psychic value (or 
utility) to a dollar gained than to a dollar lost, 
wh  i  Ie the opposite is true for risk-takers. 
Expected-utility theory indicates that risk-
averse individuals should desire to purchase 
actuarially fair insurance to protect them-
selves from low-probability catastrophic 
losses that they could not easily bear 
themselves. (Actuarially fair insurance is 
insurance which has a premium equal to the 
probability of the event times the value of the 1F~cdl~1f@n ~~§~ffW~ 
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loss.) Since most economists view the 
household as a risk-averse entity, the lack of 
consumer enthusiasm for earthquake 
insurance (and catastrophe insurance in 
general) thus comes as something of a 
surprise. 
The problem may lie with the theory. Indeed, 
economists Danial Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky have found fault with the Friedman-
Savage approach, on the basis of evidence 
from behavioral experiments and markets for 
other kinds of insurance. In particular, they 
find that people underweight remote events, 
leading to greater risk-taking than would 
otherwise be expected. 
Howard Kunreuther of the Wharton School, 
in a similar vein, argues that the expected-
utility theory operates only in an unreal world 
of perfect rationality and information. He 
argues that people may behave according to 
"bounded rationality," reluctant to purchase 
insurance or take other preventive steps 
because of limited knowledge of  the nature of 
the catastrophe. For example, even the 
availability of heavily subsidized catastrophe 
insurance has failed in some major instances 
to encourage individuals to protect them-
selves from risk. Although the residents of 
Rapid City, Iowa, qualified for subsidized 
National Flood Insurance, only about 30 
pol icies were in force there when the flood of 
1971  caused $160 million in damage to the 
community. 
Earthquake insurance 
Nonetheless, we should not ignore more 
conventional explanations for the relatively 
low level of private hazard-m itigation efforts. 
For example, premiums for earthquake 
i  nsu rance may not attract even rational and 
well-informed individuals. Indeed, catas-
trophe-insurance coverage poses special 
problems. Coverage tends to be concentrated 
in risk-prone areas-three quarters of all 
earthquake-insurance policies are written in 
California, for example-so that the insurer 
cannot reduce the cost of coverage by di-
versifying risk geographically. In theory, 
insurers could accumulate sufficient reserves 
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to protect themselves against the financial 
effects of massive claims, but they don't have 
enough experience to guide them in this area. 
In addition, U.S. tax laws don't adequately 
discriminate between catastrophe reserves 
and normal profits, as, for example, the 
Swedish and Mexican tax codes do. Thus, in 
those years when no claims are fi led, insurers 
are unable to set aside reserves for future 
contingencies without tax liability. 
Such factors will, of course, affect the cost of 
earthquake coverage. The typical pol icy for a 
wood-frame residence in California costs $2 
per year for each $1,000 of coverage, with a 
5-percent deductible and an 80-percent 
coinsurance provision. The attractiveness of 
this type of policy to individual homeowners 
depends upon their risk-averseness and the 
expected frequency and size of losses. 
Experience suggests that wood-frame res-
idences will suffer earthquake losses, on 
average, of 7 percent of value. (That was the 
average near the epicenter of the San Fer-
nando earthquake, although 50-percent 
losses were not uncommon and a few total 
losses were recorded.) Under these con-
ditions, the currenttypical premium structure 
would be actuarially "fair" for an annual-
event probability of 8 percent. This is higher 
than current earthquake-probability esti-
mates, and thus tends to make coverage less 
attractive to all but the most risk-averse 
households. 
Low utilization of  earthquake insurance thus 
seems to be a problem of weak demand at 
current premia rather than lack of awareness 
that coverage is available. Indeed, one in-
surer mounted a major marketing effort after 
the San Fernando earthquake and sold less 
than 100 policies. On the other hand, in-
su rers probably cou Id not offer coverage if 
people took a sudden interest in earthquake 
insurance, because existing reserves could 
not adequately support greatly expanded 
coverage. 
Disaster aid 
Other considerations may also act to dis-
courage private mitigation efforts. For Earthquake ,Risk Map of the  United  States 
Darkest  areas Indicate  highest risk 
Source:Applied Technology  Council 
example, the Federal government provides 
liberal disaster relief, mostly through the 
provisions of  the Federal Disaster Act and the 
emergency-lending powers of  the Small 
Business Administration (SBA). These 
programs are activated by a Presidential 
designation of a region as a disaster area. 
After the Anchorage earthquake of 1964, for 
example, the SBA loaned funds at 3 percent 
both to repair structural damage and to retire 
outstanding mortgages. Similarly, in 1971, it 
made special low-interest loans and outright 
(forgiveness) grants to uninsured earthquake 
victims in the San Fernando area. Such 
public-policy conventions, humane as they 
may seem at the time, actually increase 
further catstrophe potential by reducing the 
attention paid by private parties to risk 
exposure. 
Building economics 
The insurance market is not the only private 
activity which pays insufficient attention to 
earthquake risk-building design is another. 
Since falling structures are the major source 
of economic disruption and loss of life in an 
earthquake, it is interesting to consider the 
economics of earthquake-resistant design. 
Even in the absence of building codes, 
potential liability for injuries and loss of life 
incurred by buildings' occupants should 
encourage architects and builders to employ 
earthquake resistant design. However, the 
courts have seldom found a builder or 
designer liable for casualties arising from the 
collapse of a structure affected by a 
catastrophic natural force. (In contrast, the 
ancient Babylonian code of Hammurabi held 
the builder liable with his own life!) 
Considering the uncertainties involved, such 
a legal position is understandable, but it 
serves to weaken private incentives to 
incorporate special earthquake-resistance 
features in new construction. 
Moreover, designers often have no economic 
rationale for adding earthquake resistance to 
structures to avoid purely structural losses, 
especially in the case of  renovation. Los 
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Angeles County, for example, recently found 
that the cost of bringing 8,000 hazardous 
structures up to current standards would be 
roughly 70 percent of replacement cost. 
Given the low probability of a damaging 
earthquake in anyone location, building 
owners clearly were better off risking the total 
loss of their properties. 
Even for new construction, the cost of adding 
earthquake resistance could be a significant 
fraction of  the cost of construction -perhaps 
greater than the expected value of the loss 
that would be incurred without such 
protection. Reducing the 20-to-35 percent 
probable loss to a conventional steel-fr.ame 
highrise, for example, might raise 
construction costs by 10 percent or more. 
Given a less than 50-percent probability of 
earthquake in a building's lifetime, investors 
may not consider the additional construction 
costs warranted, particularly since the 
possible dollar losses may occur well in the 
future. Much depends, of course, on the type 
of structure involved and the risk-averseness 
ofthe investors. (Construction insurers report, 
for example, that Eastern investors are more 
concerned than Western investors about 
earthquake damage.) But private incentives 
to add earthquake resistance generally are 
rather weak. 
Conceptually, the burden of coping with 
catastrophes such as earthquakes need not be 
thrust entirely on the public sector. If 
private-market participants accurately 
perceive risks and potential losses, and 
perceive that they will bear all associated 
costs, they will devote appropriate resources 
to avoiding or mitigating catastrophic events. 
Unfortunately, public disaster-compensation 
systems, limited builder liability, and other 
cited factors may lead the private sector to 
commit insufficient resources to the 
mitigation of such hazards. If, in addition, 
individuals systematically underweight 
high-loss, low-risk events-as some research 
suggests-both the public and the 
government may be surprised by the 
magnitude of  their losses in the next major 
seismic event.  Randall J. Pozdena 'J!le::> IO:lSpueJ:I ues 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) -total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total # 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+ )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  + )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
11,183  7.9 
12,261  10.2 
4,864  13.8 
6,087  12.6 
833  3.5 
591  62.8 
877  - 13.4 
197  - 1.3 
4,835  - 10.2 
5,370  - 15.8 
576  - 1.9 
20,687  32.1 
21,347  38.2 
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